

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 JIDDA 07347 031221Z

47

ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W
----- 108086

R 031050Z NOV 75
FM AMEMBASSY JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2787
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN
AMEMBASSY CAIRO
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT
AMEMBASSY RABAT
AMEMBASSY TUNIS

S E C R E T JIDDA 7347

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR, XF, EG, US, SA
SUBJECT: SUPPORT FOR SADAT

REF: A) CAIRO 10951
B) JIDDA 6669
C) LONDON 16554

SUMMARY: WE FULLY SHARE EMBASSY CAIRO'S CONCERN ABOUT THE GROWING ISOLATION OF SADAT IN THE ARAB WORLD AND THE DANGER WHICH THIS POSES TO HIS OWN CONTINUATION IN POWER AND FUTURE PEACE AND STABILITY OF THE AREA. WE DO NOT BELIEVE, HOWEVER, THAT ANOTHER HIGH LEVEL APPROACH TO THE SAUDIS AT THIS TIME REQUESTING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR SADAT AND SINAI II IS LIKELY TO BE ANY MORE EFFECTIVE THAN PREVIOUS APPROACHES. END SUMMARY.

1. AS WE HAVE REPORTED PREVIOUSLY IN SOME DETAIL, THE SAUDIS VERY MUCH WANT SINAI II TO SUCCEED. THEY HAVE COME TO THE CONCLUSION, HOWEVER, THAT SADAT MAY HAVE GOTTEN STAMPEDED INTO A BAD BARGAIN. TO DATE THEY HAVE SEEN FEW SIGNS THAT SADAT'S GAMBLE IS PAYING OFF. THE

SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 JIDDA 07347 031221Z

SAG WAS CONVINCED AT THE TIME OF THE SIGNING OF SINAI

II THAT STEPS ON THE GOLAN FRONT WERE IMMINENT. IT WAS IN THESE CIRCUMSTANCES THAT SAUDI ARABIA INITIALLY GAVE LUKEWARM SUPPORT FOR THE AGREEMENT. WE ESTIMATE THAT THE SAUDIS COULD ONLY BE INDUCED TO SUPPORT SINAI II NOW IF THERE WERE CLEAR AND UNMISTAKABLE SIGNS THAT IT WAS PAYING OFF IN TERMS OF BROAD MOVEMENT TOWARDS A MIDDLE EAST SETTLEMENT OR (POSSIBLY) IF A CONVINCING ARGUMENT COULD BE MADE THAT SAUDI ENDORSEMENT OF THE AGREEMENT WOULD ITSELF BE A CRUCIAL FACTOR IN BRINGING ABOUT FURTHER MOVEMENT. (WE SUSPECT THAT ANY ARGUMENT SUPPORTING THIS LATTER THESIS WOULD APPEAR SO TORTUOUS TO THE SAUDIS AS TO BE INEFFECTIVE.)

2. THE SAUDIS CLEARLY HAVE NO DESIRE TO SEE SADAT OUSTED FROM POWER. (WE UNDERSTAND THAT THEY HAVE IN FACT SOUGHT TO MODERATE SYRIAN ATTACKS ON HIM AND TO SERVE AS A FREE AND USEFUL CHANNEL OF COMMUNICATION BETWEEN THE TWO GOVERNMENTS.) WE DOUBT, HOWEVER THAT THE SAUDIS SEE THE PRESENT SITUATION IN TERMS OF THE CHOICE: "SUPPORT SADAT AND SINAI II OR SEE SADAT FALL." WE BELIEVE, RATHER, THAT IF IN SAUDI EYES SINAI II DOES NOT PROVE WORTHY OF SUPPORT ON ITS OWN MERIT, I.E. IF IT FAILS TO LEAD TO FURTHER MIDDLE EAST PROGRESS, THAT THEY WOULD HOPE TO SEE SADAT SEVER HIS CONNECTION WITH THE AGREEMENT. AS WE POINTED OUT IN REF B, AT SOME POINT EGYPTIAN ADHERENCE TO AN APPARENTLY DEADENDED SINAI II COULD BE CONSIDERED BY OTHER ARABS AS TANTAMOUNT TO "OPTING OUT" OF ARAB AFFAIRS. WE BELIEVE THAT SAUDI ARABIA WILL BE PREPARED TO USE ITS ECONOMIC INFLUENCE TO SEE THAT EGYPT DOES NOT OPT OUT.

3. THERE HAS BEEN NO SUDDEN CHANGE IN SAUDI POLICY. THE SAG NEVER WAS ENTHUSIASTIC ABOUT SINAI II. SAUDI REFUSAL TO INCLUDE ANY SUPPORTIVE REFERENCE TO IT IN THE COMMUNIQUE AFTER THE LONDON VISIT OF PRINCE FAHD (REF C) SHOWS THE DRIFT OF SAUDI THINKING AND THE DEPTH OF THEIR FEELING ON THIS SUBJECT. WE DO NOT THINK THAT THERE IS LIKELY IN THE NEAR FUTURE TO BE ANY SAUDI DENUNCIATION OF THE AGREEMENT OR THAT THE SAUDIS WILL JOIN IN THE CHORUS OF ATTACKS ON SADAT. THE SAUDIS WILL
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 03 JIDDA 07347 031221Z

BE MOST EAGER TO LEARN WHAT CAME OUT OF SADAT'S US VISIT BECAUSE BASICALLY THE SAUDIS LOOK NOT TO SADAT BUT TO THE US TO MAKE SINAI II WORK.

4. THE CAIRO REFTTEL ALSO CONTAINS SEVERAL MISAPPRECIATIONS OF SAUDI ATTITUDES. MOST IMPORTANTLY, THE SAUDIS NONCOMMITTAL ATTITUDE HAS NOTHING TO DO WITH "FEAR OF RETALIATION FROM ARAB EXTREMISTS OR TERRORISTS" (PARA

4). AS NOTED ABOVE IT RELATES TO THEIR PERCEPTION OF THE EFFICACY OF THE AGREEMENT. SECONDLY, OUR SECURITY RELATIONSHIP WITH THE SAG IS INDEED AN IMPORTANT COMPONENT OF OUR OVERALL RELATIONSHIP (PARA 5) BUT SAUDI DISSATISFACTION WITH CERTAIN ASPECTS OF IT MEANS THAT IT IS AN INEFFECTIVE OR AT BEST "MAKE OR BREAK" LEVER AT THE PRESENT TIME. FINALLY, THE SAUDIS DO NOT CONSIDER THAT THEY WERE CONSULTED BY THE US IN THE NEGOTIATION OF SINAI II (PARA 5). DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS THEY WERE IN CONSTANT TOUCH WITH THE SYRIANS AND THE EGYPTIANS BUT SOON AFTER THE AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED THEY CAME TO FEEL, PERHAPS WRONGLY, THAT THE EGYPTIANS HAD BEEN LESS THAN COMPLETELY HONEST WITH THEM IN DESCRIBING THE AGREEMENT. THE SAG FEELS NO RESPONSIBILITY FOR SINAI II.

5. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, WE RECOMMEND AGAINST A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT OR THE SECRETARY URGING PUBLIC SAUDI SUPPORT FOR SINAI II. IN THE ABSENCE OF FURTHER VISIBLE PROGRESS SUCH AN APPEAL WOULD BE REJECTED.

AKINS

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: Z
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: PEACE OBSERVATION MISSIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, POPULAR SUPPORT
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 03 NOV 1975
Decaption Date: 28 MAY 2004
Decaption Note: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: RowellE0
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975JIDDA07347
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750380-1093
From: JIDDA
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19751181/aaaacuon.tel
Line Count: 137
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION SS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: EXDIS
Reference: 75 CAIRO 10951
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: RowellE0
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 01 JUL 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <01 JUL 2003 by ShawDG>; APPROVED <05 NOV 2003 by RowellE0>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: SUPPORT FOR SADAT
TAGS: PFOR, XF, EG, US, SA, (SADAT, ANWAR)
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006